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Introduction
The financial crisis triggered the impression among European 
states that the negative effects of the further decreasing defence 
budgets could be tackled by tighter defence cooperation especially 
on capability development. New initiatives have emerged both 
within NATO and the European Union in this regard, but 
interestingly, new parallel defence co-operations have also been 
created and old ones revitalized on the sub-regional level. Namely, 
although NATO and EU provide many robust mechanisms for 
defence co-operation within the frameworks of Smart Defence in 
NATO and Pooling & Sharing in EU (Ghent process), bilateral 
and regional initiatives – like the Benelux Defence Cooperation, 
the British-French ‘Lancaster House Treaties’, the Baltic Defence 
Cooperation and the Nordic Defence Cooperation – also flourish. 
Similarly to the European trends, regional defence co-operation 
has intensified in Central Europe for the past couple of years as 
well. Two co-operative frameworks are important in this regard: 
the Visegrad Group (V4) and the Central European Defence 
Initiative (CEDI).
In this paper we argue that although the V4 cooperation has 
been more visible and has become more widely discussed lately 
(Kiss 2011; Bátora and Matlary 2011; Tarasovič 2011; Weiss 
11
PERSPECTIVES OF CENTRAL 
EUROPEAN MULTINATIONAL DEFENCE 
COOPERATION: A NEW MODEL?
Introduction
Current trends of defence cooperation in Europe
Central European defence collaborations 
V4 defence cooperation
Central European Defence Initiative
How do Central European defence collaborations fit the main European trends?
List of abbreviations:
AGS – Allied Ground Surveillance System 
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
CDP – Capability Development Plan 
C-IED – Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices 
JLSG – Joint Logistics Support Group
MLCC – Multinational Logistic Co-ordination Centre 
NORDAC – Nordic Armaments Co-operation 
NORDCAPS – Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support 
NORDSUP – Nordic Supportive Defence Structures 
PESCO – Permanent Structured Co-operation
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P&S – Pooling & Sharing 
SAC – Strategic Airlift Capability 
SOF – Special Operations Forces
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2012; Šuplata 2013a; Šuplata 2013b; Lorenz 2013) thanks to the 
creation of the Visegrad Battlegroup which will be on standby in 
2016, the V4 cooperation is rather a late adaptation to an earlier 
call of the EU for creating Battlegroups than an answer for the 
problems of today. We attempt to point out that the Central 
European Defence Initiative launched in 2011 fits more to the 
current trends of defence cooperation in Europe as it intends to 
mitigate capability shortfalls by practical cooperation. We argue 
that such flexible frameworks of cooperation as CEDI, serve better 
as ‘incubators’ for novel defence cooperation initiatives. To argue 
this, in the first part of the paper we describe the main trends 
of defence cooperation in Europe, including the strengthening 
of regional cooperative efforts of the past years. Thereafter, we 
introduce the current processes of V4 cooperation and the Central 
European Defence Initiative, and finally we compare them to 
the current European trends. Here we use Nordic Defence Co-
operation (NORDEFCO) as the main reference point.
Current trends of defence cooperation in Europe
In the 2000s two main trends were identifiable in Europe 
regarding defence cooperation. 
First, European states focused on military capability 
development packages within NATO and EU, and second 
they created rapid reaction forces under the aegis of these two 
organisations. Based on the lessons learnt from earlier initiatives, 
NATO launched the NATO Response Force (NRF) and 
identified the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) package 
at the 2002 Summit in Prague (Prague Summit Declaration 2002) 
as required capability targets. With the creation of NRF, NATO 
intended to establish “a technologically advanced, flexible, 
deployable, interoperable and sustainable force, including land, 
sea and air elements ready to react quickly whenever needed” 
(Prague Summit Declaration 2002). However, PCC could not 
realize every capability target, and later the Alliance decided to 
concentrate on specific ‘high priority capability development 
areas’ of the Comprehensive Political Guidance  adopted at the 
Riga Summit in 2006 (Comprehensive Political Guidance 2006). 
Lastly the Lisbon Capabilities Package – adopted at the 2010 
Lisbon Summit – determined the direction of the Alliance’s 
capability development focusing on the needs of NATO’s ISAF 
mission and other long-existing critical shortfall areas (Lisbon 
Summit Declaration 2010). 
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At the same time, the European Union developed the EU 
Battlegroup concept and established the European Defence 
Agency. EU Battlegroups were defined as battalion-sized forces 
(approximately 1,500 troops) capable of deployment in 15 days 
and to be sustained for 30 days or 120 days by rotation in crisis 
management operations. According to the concept, two EU 
Battlegroups were to be available at any particular point in time 
with individual battlegroups following a six month rotation. 
EDA was intended to be the catalyst of European defence 
cooperation in crisis management capabilities by developing 
capabilities, promoting cooperation on research and technology 
(R&T) and armaments and also fostering competitive European 
Defence Equipment Market. EDA, together with the EU 
Military Committee (EUMC), played a key role in elaborating 
the Capability Development Plan (CDP) in 2008, which defined 
“future capability needs from the short to longer term.” More 
recently, the Lisbon Treaty provided the opportunity for the 
creation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 
defence for “those [European Union] Member States whose 
military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made 
more binding commitments to one another in this area with a 
view to the most demanding missions (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 
42.6.).” 
Because of the disagreements among European states regarding 
PESCO’s realization and especially  due to the negative effects 
of the financial crisis, the EU began to focus on more practical 
approaches of ‘pooling’ of capabilities to mitigate the negative 
financial effects. Thus, EU defence ministers put the concept of 
Pooling & Sharing (P & S) to the top of the agenda of EU defence 
policy at their meeting in Ghent in September 2010. At the 
Munich Security Conference in February 2011, NATO Secretary 
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen launched an initiative very 
similar to the Ghent Process in NATO, called ‘Smart Defence’ 
(Rasmussen 2011). According to Rasmussen, “Smart Defence is 
about building security for less money by working together and 
being more flexible (Rasmussen 2012, 5).” 
Parallel with these processes within NATO and EU new 
regional and bilateral defence collaborations have emerged and old 
ones have been revitalized. Among others the United Kingdom 
and France signed the so-called Lancaster House Treaties in 
2010 on cooperation in strategically crucial fields. In 2012, the 
Ministers of Defence of the Benelux states signed a declaration 
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on defence cooperation to reinvigorate their long-standing 
defence collaboration. In 2011, the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania) announced new defence cooperation initiatives 
on “sharing national infrastructures for training purposes and 
specialisation of training areas” and “collective formation 
for contingents” within NRF (National Defence Republic of 
Lithuania 2011). 
In 2009, the five Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden – established the Nordic Defence 
Cooperation (NORDEFCO) which covers almost the whole 
spectrum of their defence sectors in order to achieve cost-
effectiveness and enhanced operational capability. “The main aim 
and purpose of the Nordic Defence Cooperation is to strengthen 
the participating nations’ national defence, explore common 
synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions” (Nordefco). 
The Nordic countries also had a well institutionalized system for 
military collaboration before the creation of NORDEFCO. In 
the 1990s they established the Nordic Armaments Cooperation 
(NORDAC) in order to coordinate their military development 
and procurement programmes, created the Nordic Coordinated 
Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) to 
provide “joint Nordic training for peace support operations, as 
well as coordinated Nordic contributions to capacity building 
and security sector reform in weak and developing states” (Saxi 
2011, 16). Finally, in 2008 Norway, Sweden and Finland decided 
to establish Nordic Supportive Defence Structures (NORDSUP) 
to co-operate more deeply in training, logistics and production 
(Saxi 2011, 17). In 2009 NORDEFCO merged these three 
different cooperative frameworks, thus operating as a clearing 
house for defence related collaborations in the Nordic region. 
The biggest advantage of NORDEFCO is its flexibility. As Juha 
Jokela and Tuomas Iso-Markku point out “whereas some earlier 
Nordic endeavours have suffered from lack of interest by one or 
several of the Nordic states, NORDEFCO allows for any form of 
cooperation, be it bilateral, trilateral or multilateral. At the same 
time, existing forms of cooperation are open for the other Nordic 
states to join at any point” (Jokela and Iso-Markku 2013, 9).
Central European defence collaborations
As mentioned above, we can differentiate between two 
multinational frameworks of defence cooperation in Central 
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Europe − that of the Visegrad Countries (V4) and the Central 
European Defence Initiative (CEDI, previously known as 
the Central European Roundtable on Defence Cooperation). 
International experts have been paying ever more attention to 
these multinational forms of defence cooperation and military 
capability development since the financial crisis hit the defence 
sector in Central Europe with an austerity not seen since the 
end of the Cold War.2 Recently comparative expert papers have 
also been prepared with focus on the lessons learnt from existing 
defence cooperation frameworks and identifying the best suitable 
practices that might be able to further enhance and bring forward 
these collaborations (Valasek and Suplata, 2012; Budai, 2013). 
The obvious reason for this renewed interest is the momentum 
that the Visegrad Cooperation and CEDI have been gathering 
since 2011.
After the defence dimension of the Visegrad Cooperation 
was relatively fruitless for two decades, 2011-2012 brought V4 
countries to a new level: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia decided to establish a joint EU Battlegroup. Even 
though there is still a long way to go to make the V4 Battlegroup 
a reality, it is beyond doubt a first step of pooling capabilities. 
CEDI, born as the Central European Roundtable on Defence 
Cooperation in 2011, has  received less attention as this new 
framework for defence collaboration among Austria, Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia has been 
functioning rather as an ‘incubator’ for new, practical initiatives 
that can be realized on the ground in the short term. The 
potential in CEDI, however, seems to be substantial, as several 
actual projects have successfully been carried out by participating 
states.
It is obvious that these two frameworks differ significantly 
in terms of structure, institutionalization, membership and the 
way they function, and have triggered successful initiatives to a 
varying degree. As we attribute the different dynamics behind the 
functioning of these defence collaborations to the different setup 
that characterizes them, the following subchapters will briefly 
assess and compare these, highlighting those characteristics that 
are more capable of bringing cooperation forward based on the 
experience gained and lessons learned so far.
2 On the V4 see: Kiss, 2011; 
Weiss, 2012, Valasek and 
Suplata, 2012. On CEDI 
see: Csiki and Németh, 
2012, Kurowska and Né-
meth, 2013
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V4 defence cooperation
Cooperation among the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary 
and Poland in the framework of the Visegrad Group – or Visegrad 
Four (V4) – dates back to 1991 when regional cooperation in 
Central Europe was pursued in order to mutually enhance the 
chances of Euro-Atlantic integration of these four (then three 
with Czechoslovakia being one federative state) countries. It 
was determined however that the cooperation of the Visegrad 
countries would be based on wide-ranging areas, including 
political, economic and cultural ones on which  all participants 
wished to cooperate along shared interests. Regional patterns of 
cooperation among these countries in defence-related matters 
have taken place only on a limited scale even after NATO and 
EU accessions for example by harmonizing point of views 
and adopting joint declarations on defence and foreign policy. 
Nevertheless despite their respective contributions to NATO 
collective defence and operations, as well as to EU CSDP, a 
characteristic ‘V4 defence project’ has not appeared until 2011.
Following two fruitless decades in this field, the four countries 
agreed to establish a European Union Battlegroup in May 2011 – 
expected to become operational and be on standby in the first half 
of 2016. The role of the lead nation of the Visegrad Battlegroup 
is undertaken by Poland, also providing the majority of the 
troops (900), while the Czech Republic provides 750, Hungary 
510 and Slovakia 450 troops. Negotiations on force generation 
are under way as the V4 Ministers of Defence signed their Letter 
of Intent (LoI) at their meeting on March 6, 2013 on creating the 
Battlegroup. In addition Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) 
and Technical Agreements (TA) are under preparation to make 
practical cooperation possible. Having a modular structure, the 
leading roles for 7 out of 8 functional modules have already been 
divided among the participants. However, critical capability 
shortfalls are still on the table, combat and transport helicopters 
and strategic airlift among others that will need to be provided 
(Tófalvi, 2013). Other issues, including the permanence of 
the Battlegroup as a sustained capability package among the 
V4 countries and the possible application of the BG have also 
remained topics for further negotiation.
Moreover, the V4 Battlegroup gives an old answer to an old 
question dating back to 2004 by pooling the types of capabilities 
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that might never be applied in practice as the European Union 
lacks the necessary political commitment so far to use the much-
appreciated Battlegroups even in times of need. Even if it did 
allow their use in a future EU crisis management operation, we 
must admit that the focus must be on filling the  missing military 
capabilities as the primary target of any new initiatives in defence 
cooperation, which goes beyond just incorporating the existing 
units into new force structures. Achieving this bears significant 
value for providing capable, deployable multinational units that 
could not be provided on a national basis, but is less likely to fill 
capability shortfalls that could be covered only through deeper 
cooperation in the form capability sharing  (joint procurement 
and development).
It is beyond doubt that the V4 Battlegroup has become the 
flagship project of the Visegrad countries – and practically 
the only such project that has been born and nurtured as a V4 
defence project. The reasons why cooperation in defence has been 
limited compared to other fields (energy policy being a successful 
example) is in our opinion due to the setup and characteristics of 
the cooperation, in particular the following:
- V4 is a structured, institutionalized framework for 
cooperation, thus it is more rigid;
- V4  is made up of uneven partners regarding size, resources 
and capabilities (three small ones  and a middle-size country 
exceeding their combined size), thus it  invites dependencies and 
inequalities;
- V4 projects are initiated based on the consensual 
participation of all four Visegrad countries serving as a shared 
platform of initiatives, thus limiting the opportunity of 
spontaneous collaborations by two or three partners.
These aspects limit the opportunities of cooperation to a 
certain extent, especially in the early period of incubating and 
nurturing newborn ideas when it  is especially important to 
ensure flexibility to find suitable solutions. Since both policy 
makers and experts agree (see for example: Rasmussen, 2012, 
Valasek and Suplata, 2012) that flexibility and adaptability are 
key enablers to successful co-operation, less rigid and regulated, 
and more tailored-to-needs forms of cooperation should be given 
preference, as is explained  below.
TAMÁS CSIKI, BENCE NÉMETH
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Central European Defence Initiative
A brand new framework for defence cooperation among 
Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and 
Slovenia began in 2011,  originally called the Central European 
Roundtable on Defence Co-operation, more recently named 
Central European Defence Initiative. This framework includes 
the fields of training, operations and capability development and 
has achieved the following results by 2013 (Tófalvi, 2013):
- Following upon the Czech initiative a multinational 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) a 
defence battalion has been created involving the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia among the CEDI countries and 
extended to include Poland, also becoming the lead nation of the 
battalion, including a successful Smart Defence program. Other 
countries have also expressed their interest in the formation.
- Based on the ‘food for thought’ paper produced by 
Austria and Croatia, bilateral cooperation in the field of training 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) is underway by now and might 
be further extended to other CEDI countries offering joint SOF 
training.
- As the Multinational Logistic Co-ordination Centre 
(MLCC) was established in the Czech Republic in 2010, a 
regionally focused initiative to create a multinational Joint 
Logistics Support Group (JLSG) is now on the table. MLCC has 
become a Smart Defence Tier 1 project since then.
- Hungary produced a ‘food for thought’ paper on Counter-
Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) cooperation and in this 
framework ‘Train the Trainers’ and ‘Weapons Intelligence Team’ 
(WIT) activities have been successful in sharing lessons learned.
- The joint training of Czech, Croatian and Hungarian Air 
Mentor Teams for Afghanistan begun thanks to the negotiations 
taking place within CEDI and has been successfully taking place 
since, in parallel with negotiations on deeper regional cooperation 
in aviation training.
Based on these projects, we can genuinely state that initiatives 
nurtured in the CEDI framework have proven to be successful, 
evolving both in terms of participants, attracting  additional 
countries to join, and in terms of integration into NATO Smart 
Defence programs. Thus, even though literature on CEDI is 
limited (Csiki and Németh, 2012), based on the experience 
gathered so far we can already outline the fundamental 
characteristics of this framework:
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- CEDI is not structured and has remained un-
institutionalized, thus providing more flexible options for 
negotiation (building on expert-level meetings and the formal 
meetings of Defence Policy Directors as well as the informal 
meetings of Ministers of Defence);
- CEDI  is made up of relatively even partners regarding 
size, resources and capabilities (six small countries, none 
possessing disproportionately greater capabilities);
- CEDI projects are initiated based on voluntary 
participation of any partner countries, giving them the option to 
choose à la carte among defence cooperation initiatives without 
formal obligations.
This means that the participants of CEDI build practical and 
more flexible forms of cooperation, starting with the spontaneous 
cooperation of 2-3 countries, with CEDI playing the role of an 
open forum and clearing house. As experience has shown, there 
are cases when the ‘incubation’ period was so successful that more 
countries also joined the initiative, developing it into broader 
regional as well as viable Smart Defence programs. Significantly, 
CEDI seems to be more fruitful and effective than Visegrad 4 
formalised cooperation.
How do Central European defence collaborations fit the 
main European trends?
We can draw further conclusions by comparing the two main 
frameworks of military cooperation in Central Europe – V4 
and CEDI – to the current European trends. The creation of 
the Visegrad Battlegroup is a great achievement for the Central 
European region, compared to what Central European regional 
initiatives have achieved since the end of the Cold War. Basically, 
the Central European countries could not establish a single 
viable, significant regional defence initiative. Probably, this is the 
reason why many analysts  took notice of the news of the creation 
of the Visegrad Battlegroup, and not for other Battlegroups.
At the same time, we have to recognize that the Visegrad 
Battlegroup tries to answer a demand which emerged ten years 
ago when the EU Battlegroup concept had been framed in 
2004. At that time many believed that these force packages will 
provide the answer for response capabilities for smaller crises, 
but the usefulness and applicability of EU Battlegroups have 
TAMÁS CSIKI, BENCE NÉMETH
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body was also chaired by 
Lithuania from mid-2009 
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(Czech Republic, Hungary, 
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been questioned as they have never been used despite the fact 
that there was a demand for it from the international community 
(Major and Mölling, 2011, Hatzigeorgopoulos 2012). In addition, 
Tomáš Weiss highlights that the Visegrad Battlegroup “is not 
and cannot be the answer to the region’s difficulty in sustaining 
a reasonable level of military power.” Thus, “development of 
further common capabilities should follow, starting with training, 
schooling, and maintenance” (Weiss, 2011). Accordingly, we 
can perceive the creation of the Visegrad Battlegroup as a late 
adaptation for a decade old demand of generating rapid reaction 
forces and capability development packages rather than fitting 
into the current trend of European defence collaborations at a 
time when everyone focuses on cost effectiveness and Pooling & 
Sharing of capabilities.
On the contrary, CEDI provides a forum for six Central 
European countries where they can raise potential areas of 
practical cooperation and each and every country is free to join 
and contribute. Thus, cooperation is forged on the grounds of 
flexible and practical mechanisms while there is no ‘institutional 
pressure’ – as would have been the case in the Visegrad format, 
where the support of all participating countries is necessary 
to begin to cooperate on any issue. Last but not least, all 
participating countries in CEDI have about the same level of 
resources and military manpower, providing equal weight and 
influence, unlike the Visegrad Group, which includes Poland, 
which is often considered the ‘lead nation’ (Budai, 2013).
It is also important to note that CEDI has not just provided the 
grounds for new initiatives, but in the cases of the Joint Logistics 
Support Group and the CBRN Battalion these initiatives had 
been extended to include all Visegrad countries (and even 
beyond), thus becoming a successful ‘incubator of ideas’ for the 
V4 cooperation, which had later on trickled into NATO’s Smart 
Defence framework in which such ‘grass-root initiatives’ can 
complement large-scale multinational capability development 
(e.g. procurement) programs.
We can summarize the lessons learned with regard to V4, 
CEDI and NORDEFCO in the below comparison based on  the 
characteristics of each that have been discussed throughout the 
paper (the summary of the characteristics of NORDEFCO is 
provided partly based upon Bátora and Matlary, 2011):
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Characteristics V 4 CEDI NORDEFCO
Structured, 
institutionalized 
framework
YES NO YES
Partners and their 
capabilities
UNEVEN EVEN UNEVEN
Participation 
mechanisms
CONSENSUAL
MORE RIGID
FREE-TO-JOIN
MORE 
FLEXIBLE
FREE-TO-JOIN
MORE 
FLEXIBLE
Function PLATFORM
FORUM AND 
CLEARING 
HOUSE
FORUM AND 
CLEARING 
HOUSE
Provides answers 
to
EARLIER 
NEEDS
CURRENT 
NEEDS
CURRENT 
NEEDS
Nevertheless CEDI and V4 cooperation should not be seen 
as competitive frameworks but rather as collaborations that can 
complement each other. There are situations when the presence 
and the weight of a strong lead nation is necessary for creating 
successful defence cooperation, especially when the collaboration 
exceeds the usual bi- and trilateral frameworks. Good examples 
of this are the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) and Allied 
Ground Surveillance System (AGS) in NATO, where the role 
of the United States has been indispensable for leading many 
nations to establish big projects. Because of its size and defence 
budget, Poland could play a similar leading role in Central 
Europe where the Visegrad framework could be at the core in 
cases involving costly and complicated military collaborations 
where the contribution of several countries is needed. At the 
same time CEDI can remain the primary forum for creating bi- 
and trilateral defence collaborations among similar sized Central 
European states, because of its flexibility and clearing house 
role. This division of labour between CEDI and V4 can provide 
a healthy environment for fulfilling different needs regarding 
military cooperation in Central Europe. 
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